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 1.  Introduction 
   The  2007-­‐2008  financial  market  turbulences  have  determined  the  most  severe  financial  crisis  
since  the  1929’s  Great  Depression,  its  consequences  being  felt  in  all  the  segments  of  real  economy.    
Instability  soared  across  national  borders,  from  developed  to  emerging  economies,  from  one  sector  
to   another,   from   housing   into   banking   and   the   related   financial   markets,   hitting   private   firms’  
balance  sheets,  imposing  new  demands  on  the  public  sector’s  financing  needs.  
   Various  countries  have   responded  differently   to   the  crisis  depending  on   their  development  
stage,  accordingly  implementing  monetary  and  fiscal  policies.    
   In   this   paper,   will   be   analyzed   using   empirical   evidence   the   crisis   impact   on   three  
fundamental   inter-­‐correlated  areas  of  the  economy:  consumption,  banking,  real  estate.  There  were  
made   comparisons   and   interpretations   upon   indicators   considered   to   be   representatives   for   the  
above   mentioned   areas:   unemployment   rate,   salaries,   purchasing   power,   crediting   level,   interest  
rates,  construction  work  rates,  etc.  
1.1 Literature  review  
   The   financial   crisis   has   been   a   much   discussed   subject   since   its   effects   determined   deep  
changes  in  the  real  economy  and  in  the  mass  and  individuals’  psychology.  
   Minzen   (2008)   made   a   deep   analysis   of   the   financial   crisis   that   started   in   the   US   as   the  
“subprime  crisis”.  He  argued  that  there  were  a  number  of  factors  providing  conditions  for  a  crisis  to  
manifest:  period  of  exceptional  stability,  financial  innovations,  and  the  rise  in  the  house  prices.  With  
banks  failing  due  to  liquidity  crisis,  Minzen  is  emphasizing  the  role  of  central  banks  and  authorities  in  
providing  liquidity  and  in  supporting  the  economies.     He  concludes  with  the  importance  of  creating  
regulation  and  supervision  frame  in  order  to  face  the  rapid  financial  innovation.  
   In   addition,   Lin   (2008)   investigated   the   impact   of   the   financial   crisis   on   the   developing  
countries,   warning   about   the   emerging   markets’   danger   of   passing   crisis   of   their   own   with   a  
supplementary  pressure  upon  other  segments  of  economy  (banking).  He  emphasized  the  importance  
of   the   government   adopting   the   right   fiscal   and   monetary   policy   according   to   the   economy’s  
macroeconomic   indicators,   with   international   organizations   supporting   the   emerging   markets.   He  
concludes,  in  the  same  manner  as  above,  with  the  need  for  controlling  the  asset  price  inflation  and  
for  financial  supervision.  
   Brunnermeier   (2008)   characterizes   the   current   crisis   as   being   one   surprisingly   close   to   a  
“classical  banking”  one  but  with  an  intensive  securitization  that  led  to  the  creation  of  exponential  risk  
caused  by   “opaque  web  of   interconnected  obligations”.   Like   in   the   previous  papers,  Brunnermeier  
ends  by  discussing  about   the  direction  of   the   future   financial   regulations   that   should  be   related   to  
the  complexity  of  financial  instruments.    
   Rose   and   Spiegel   (2009)   try   to   create   a   model   of   the   financial   crisis   together   with   its  
manifestation.   The   model   combines   changes   in   economic   indicators   (GDP,   stock   prices,   country  
rating,  exchange  rates)  with  categories  like:  financial  system  policies,  asset  price  appreciation  in  the  
real   estate   and   equity   markets,   international   imbalances,   foreign   reserve   levels,   institutional   and  
geographic   features).   The   conclusion   was   that   the   causes   of   the   crisis   were   idiosyncratic,   with  
opaque  linkages  that  cannot  be  easily  quantified.  
   Schwartz   (2008)  examined  three   factors  with  significant   influence  on  the  emergence  of   the  
global   crisis:   expansive   monetary   policy,   imperfect   financial   innovations   and   collapse   of   trading.  
While   agreeing  with   the   idea   that   insolvent   firms  must   not   be   recapitalized,   she   concluded   that   a  
procedure  should  be  implemented  in  order  to  examine  portfolios  of  bank  and  financial  institutions  to  
identify  the  problematic  ones.  
   Donath  and  Cismas  (2009)  examined  in  their  paper  the  important  role  Central  Bank  is  playing  
in   Romania   in   supporting   the   exchange   rate   and   inflationary   pressure   through   the   implemented  
monetary  policy.  They  are  arguing  about  the  necessity  of  the  government  implementing  a  policy  that  
assumes   investments   in   productive   segments   of   economy.   They   conclude   by   emphasizing   the  
importance   of   credibility,   consumption,   of   implementing   a   smooth   restoration   of   macroeconomic  
balance  and  efficient  public  deficit’s  management.  
   Zaman   (2009)   examined   the   pre-­‐electoral   optimism   regarding   the   crisis  manifestation   and  
the   post-­‐electoral   reality.  He   concluded   that   effective  measures   cannot   be   taken   unless   there   is   a  
support  coming  from  the  international  institutions  (International  Monetary  Fund  and  World  Bank).  
   1.2  Origins  of  the  financial  market  crisis  
   1.1.1  The  environment  before  the  crisis  
   The   financial   crisis   started   to   manifest   in   an   environment   characterized   by   factors   like:  
expansive   monetary   and   fiscal   policy,   flawed   financial   innovations   and,   consequently,   the  
transformation  of  traditional  banking  model  into  “originate  and  distribute”  model.    
   The  US  expansive  monetary  environment  was  explained  through  the  following:      
*   large  capital   inflows   from  abroad,  Asian  countries   (China,   Japan   )buying  US  securities   to   stabilize  
the  exchange  rate  in  order  to  increase  incomes  from  exports  and  to  hedge  against  a  depreciation  of  
their  currencies  against  dollar1.  Developing  countries  shifted  toward  accumulating   large  volumes  of  
US   assets,   funding   the   growing   deficits   in   US   (generally,   in   industrialized   countries)   and   creating  
imbalances  among  countries  with  large  current  account  surpluses  and  deficits;  
  *the  Federal  Reserve  feared  a  deflationary  period  after  bursting  of  the  US  tech-­‐stock  bubble  in  2000,  
easing  in  this  way  the  monetary  policy  by  lowering  the  discount  rate  27  times  between  January  2001-­‐
June  2003.  This   situation   stimulated  a  boom   in   the  housing  market,  with   increasing  housing  prices  
that  fueled  the  consumption  boom,  respectively  the  credit  expansion.  The  above  mentioned  period  
has  been  described  as  the  Great  Moderation  in  the  US  and  the  Great  Stability  in  UK  (Minzen,  2008),  
being  characterized  by  low  inflation,  low  nominal  short-­‐term  interest  rate  and  steady  growth.    
   Another   factor   influencing   the   emergence   of   the   credit   crunch   was   the   adoption   of  
innovations   (Lian,  2008)   in   financial   instruments   (securitization,  derivatives,  auction-­‐rate   securities)  
driven  by   the   search  of  higher   yields   in   a   low-­‐interest-­‐rate  environment.   In   this   case,   the  problem  
arose   from   the   difficulty   of   determining   the   instruments’   prices   and   from   the   lack   of   regulations  
regarding   the   respective   instruments   and   the   issuing   companies.   As   a   consequence,   the   risk   was  
spread   in   such   a   complex   manner   that   neither   the   designer,   nor   the   buyer   of   these   instruments  
understood   the   risk   they   imposed.   The   mortgage   loan   securitization   encountered   diverse   loan  
categories,  from  the  mortgage  industry  to  commercial  paper  issuance,  student  loans,  and  credit  card  
receivables.  The  pool  of  mortgages  standing  behind  the  mortgage-­‐backed  securities  was  difficult  to  
price,   the   specialized   agencies   assigning   ratings   to   complex   securities   in   a   similar   manner   as   for  
ordinary  corporate  bonds.  
   Related   to   the   creation   of   the   innovative   financial   instruments,   the   banking   system  
underwent   a   fundamental   transformation   from   the   traditional   banking  model,   in   which   the   loans  
were   held   until   they   were   repaid,   to   the   “originate   and   distribute”   model,   in   which   loans   were  
pooled,  divided  into  tranches  and  passed  to  other  financial      investors,  in  this  way  off-­‐loading  risk.  
	   1.1.2	  The	  Subprime	  Mortgage	  Market	  and	  the	  Securitization	  
   With   low   interest   rate  policies,   laws  allowing  mortgage   lending  at  high   interest   rates,   fees,  
tax  advantages2  and  premises  of  continuous  increase  in  house  prices,  there  were  created  favorable  
conditions   for  both  borrowers  and   lenders.  As  borrowers   continued   to   seek   funds   in  order   to  gain  
from   the   differences   in   the   real   estate   values,   lenders   increased   lending,   extending   the   scope   of  
lending   to   include   lower   quality   mortgages   (subprime   mortgages)3.   According   to   Minzen   (2008),  
                                                                                                                          
1  Consequence  of  the  Southeast  Asian  crisis  of  late  1990s;  
2  The  Tax  Reform  Act  (1982)  ended  tax  deduction  for  interest  on  forms  of  borrowings  other  than  mortgages;  
3  There  were  noticed  2  periods  of  growth  in  subprime  mortgages  –  one  during  late  1990s  and  the  other  one  
from  2002  to  2006  (Jaffee,  2008);  
Subprime  mortgages   can   be   defined   through   2   approaches,   one   related   to   the   originators   of   the  
mortgages   (the   proportion   to   which   loans   are   refinanced),   the   other   referring   to   the   previous  
recording   of   the   borrower   (regarding   delinquency,   foreclosure   or   bankruptcy).      The   subprime  
mortgage  is  characterized  by  higher  up-­‐front  fees,  higher   insurance  costs,  fines  for   late  payment  or  
delinquency  and  higher   interest  rates  (to  cover  the  higher  default  risk),  with  a  higher  probability  of  
termination  through  prepayment  or  default.  There  were   loans  with  options  to  defer  payments  that  
converted  from  fixed  to  variable  interest  rates,  low-­‐documented  in  order  to  access  market  segments  
represented  by  buyers  with  poor  credit/income  histories  or  with  variable  income.  
   The   banks’   movement   toward   “originate   and   distribute”  model   and   the   financing   of   their  
asset  holdings  with  shorter  maturity   instruments  (Brunnermeier,  2009),  determined  the  creation  of  
structured  products   referred   to  as   collateralized  debt  obligations   (CDOs  –  asset  backed   securities),  
including   residential   mortgage   backed   securities   (composed   of   different   types   of   mortgages)   and  
based  upon   this,  other   instruments   such  as   credit  default   swaps   (CDS)4,   trade   indices   consisting  of  
portfolio   credit   default   swaps.      The   process   was   constituted   from   several   steps   in   which   the  
underlying   credit   risk  was   first   unbundled,   tiered,   securitized   and   distributed   to   end   investors   like  
primary   lenders,   mortgage   brokers,   bond   insurers,   credit   rating   agencies,   structured   investment  
vehicles.  It  has  been  shown  that  many  of  the  purchasers  were  off-­‐balance  sheet  institutions  created  
and/or   owed   by   banks   that   had   originally   sold   the   securitized   instrument,   in   order   to   avoid   the  
capital  control  requirements  applied  to  banks  according  to  Basel  I  regulations.    
   The  complexity  of   the  products  developed  by   the  private  sector  stood   in   the   fact   that   they  
implied  a  more  variable  cash  flow,  a  greater  default  risk  as   low  quality  mortgages  were   included   in  
pools,  and  high  level  of  heterogeneity  in  the  tranches.    
   With   statistical  models   of  many  professional   investors   and   credit   rating   agencies   providing  
positive   information   on   structured   finance   products,   being   rated   more   favorable   than   corporate  
bonds,  with  fund  managers   in  searches  for  high  expected  returns  with  small  probability  of  extreme  
loss  there  were  created  the  premises  of  increased  popularity  regarding  the  securitized  products.  
   1.3  The  credit  crunch  
   The  popularity   of   the   respective  products   backed  by   good   ratings   and   the   idea   that   house  
prices   could   only   rise   led   to   a   decline   in   the   credit   quality,   mortgage   brokers   offering   low   teaser  
rates,  no-­‐documentation  mortgages,  piggyback  mortgages,  “No  Income,  No  Job  or  Asset”  loans.  
   As  the  subprime  mortgages  default  rate  mounted  in  2006,   it  was  revealed  that  the  risk  was  
not   diminished   using   product   pools,   the   defaults   being   positively   correlated   (Minzen,   2008).   This  
                                                                                                                          
4  According  to  Brunnermeier  (2009)  the  gross  notional  amount  of  outstanding  credit  default  swaps  in  2007  
ranged  from  45  trillion  USD  to  62  trillion  USD;  
situation   was   doubled   by   the   subprime   mortgage   investors   that   leveraged   their   positions   with  
borrowed  funds  represented  by  short-­‐term  loans.  
   The   trigger   for   the   liquidity   crisis   was   caused   by   an   increase   in   the   subprime   mortgage  
defaults   (see  graphic  with   residential  mortgage  delinquency  rates)  with   rating  agencies   introducing  
tranches  from  subprime  deals  in  “downgrade  review”,  indicating  in  this  way  the  high  likelihood    to  be  
downgraded.  The  uncertainty  created,  sustained  by  the  difficulty  of  assessing  the  exposure   level  of  
the   structured   products   to   subprime   loans   had   a   negative   impact   on   the   interbank  market,   banks  
becoming   reluctant   to   lend   to   each   other.   The   situation   influenced   the   spreads   between   interest  
rates   like:   LIBOR-­‐OIS   spread   that   increased   by   100bp   and   TED   spread   (Treasury-­‐Eurodollar)   that  
became  even  wider  (Brunnermeier,  2009).  
  
   The  resulting  freeze   in  the  capital  and  money  markets  affected  certain  financial   institutions  
depending  on  the  markets  to  find  liquidity,  like  commercial  banks  relying  on  short-­‐term  commercial  
papers   could   not   obtain   funds   and   investment   banks   that   had   bought   asset-­‐backed   securities  
through  short-­‐term  papers,  not  being  able  to  pay  the  due-­‐amounts.  The  liquidity  panic  in  the  markets  
determined  the  bailouts  of   institutions   like  Lehman  Brothers,  Merrill  Lynch,  AIG  and  the  run  of   the  
Northern  Rock  Bank.  
   In   order   for   the   situation   to   be   kept   under   control   distressing   institutions   and   market  
liquidity,  the  central  banks  provided  funding  liquidity:  
-­‐ ECB  organized  forward  auctions  for  liquidity;  
-­‐ ECB  offered   lending   at   longer  maturities   (there  was   a   shortage  of   funds   at   1-­‐,   3-­‐,   6-­‐month  
maturities)  against  a  wide  range  of  collaterals;  
-­‐ Federal   Reserve   announced   a   term  auction   facility   for   a   predetermined  one-­‐month  money  
direct  from  Fed;  
-­‐ Federal   Reserve   established   two   further   facilities:   a   primary   dealer   credit   facility   and   a  
weekly   term   securities   lending   facility   to   offer   Treasury   securities   on   a   one  month   loan   to  
investment  banks  against  eligible  collateral  as  MBSs;  
-­‐ The   Bank   of   England   injected  marketable   assets   into   banking   system,   providing   long   term  
asset  swaps  to  any  bank  eligible  to  borrow  from  the  National  Bank.  
   1.4  The  Credit  Crunch  and  the  Developing  Countries  
   The  growth  encountered  by  the  developed  countries  before  the  crisis  hit  influenced  also  the  
developing  countries  through  increased  export  revenues  (determined  by  higher  export  demand  from  
developed   countries),   higher   commodity   prices,   rise   in   foreign   direct   investments,   increased  
remittances   from   abroad.   With   the   developing   markets   opening   their   economies   during   the   last  
decade,   exports   as   share   of   GDP   increased   in   the   interval   2000-­‐2007   from   29%   to   39%   (Global  
Development  Finance,  2008).  As   seen   from   the  data  provided  by  World  Bank   (Table  1.  Net  Capital  
Flows  table-­‐Appendix  )  ,  the  level  of  FDI  to  developing  countries  increased  during  2002  to  2007  from  
160.7   billion   USD   to   470.8   billion   USD,   this   being   explained   by   the   investors   searching   for   higher  
returns   being   given   the   low   yields   in   the  mature   economies.  With   increasing   sources   of   financing  
(bank   lending,   bond   flows,   FDIs,   remittances   from   abroad   rising   to   240   billion   USD   in   2007),   the  
developing  world  achieved  high  growth  rates,  translated    into  a  GDP  increasing  of  more  than  5%  per  
year  from  2003  to  2007(Graph  1.  GDP  growth-­‐Appendix).  
   After   the   credit   crunch   boom   in   the   developed   economies,   the   crisis   wave   affected   the  
developing   countries   being   registered   substantial   reduction   in   their   exports   (declines   in   terms   of  
trade,   global   slowdown   reduces   the   demand   for   commodities   and  manufactured   goods),   negative  
shock  to  investments  (portfolio  investment  will  fall,  as  greater  risk  aversion  keeps  the  capital  away),  
reduction   in   remittances.   In   figures,   according   to   World   Bank   data,   the   reduction   in   exports  
registered  at   the  beginning  of  2009  a  value  of   -­‐35%.   In  2008,   the  net   international   flows  of  private  
capital  to  developing  world  fell  to  707  billion  USD  (4.4%  of  developing  county  GDP)  from  the  record-­‐
high  level  of  1.2  trillion  USD  (8.6%  of  GDP  in  2007).  Regarding  the  GDP  evolution,  the  prospects  for  
developing  countries  were  referring  to  a  4.7%  deceleration.  
   Regarding   the   emerging   markets,   it   has   been   proved   the   existence   of   a   distinct   danger  
related   to   the  possibility  of   the  developing  economies   to  go   through  crises  of   their  own   (domestic  
asset-­‐market  bubbles)  with  impact  on  all  sectors  of  real  domestic  economy.  
	   2.  The  case  of  Romania  
  
   In   the   years   before   crisis,   Romania   was   characterized   by   an   increase   in   relevant   financial  
indicators  like  final  consumption,  gross  capital  formation,  GDP.  The  growth  Romania  has  experienced  
is   demonstrated   by   an   average   increase   of   GDP   of   around   6%   per   year,   in   the   period   2005-­‐2008  
(from  a  4.1%  increase  in  2005  to  a  7.3%  increase  in  2008).  Investments  continued  to  be  supported  to  
a  large  extent  by  Foreign  Direct  Investments  (FDI),  in  this  sense  being  seen  an  increase  from  6.5  USD  
billion   in   2005   to  more   than  double   in   2008.      Investment   rate   registered  a   continuous   increase   as  
Romanian   economy   is   trying   to   catch   up   with   technological   competition   in   areas   like   industry,  
construction   and   agriculture.   As   a   consequence,   in   the   structure   of   investments   could   have   been  
seen  an  orientation  toward  constructions  sector,  reporting  a  yoy  increase  in  first  six  months  of  2007  
of  31.4%.  
   During  the  period  taken  into  analysis,  it  was  registered  an  upward  trend  in  gross  fixed  capital  
formation,  which  picked  up  from  8.6%  yoy  in  2003  to  16.1  in  2006.  
   The  widening  of  trade  deficit,  particularly  between  2007  and  2008,  reflected  a  lower  level  of  
competitiveness  and  imposed  the  necessity  of  further  investments  inflows.  This  aspect  was  sustained  
by   the   fact   that   in   2007   Romania   became   EU  member   and   started   to   face   true   competition.   The  
Romanian   current   account   deficit   was   strongly   influenced   by   the   trade   balance   that   registered   a  
deficit   that   almost  doubled   from  2006   to  2008.   In   this   sense,   exports   remained  much   slower   than  
imports,   with   a   positive   aspect   regarding   the   exports   structure   that   improved   in   favor   of   high  
complexity  goods.  In  evolution,  exports  increased  from  27.7  USD  bn  in  2005  to  49.8  USD  bn  in  2008,  
while  imports  followed  a  higher  increase  from  37.3  USD  bn  to  77.9  USD  bn  in  the  same  period.  
  Indicator Measure 2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010e 2011f 
Nominal GDP USD bn 99.2 122.7 170.6 204.3 161.1 158 168.4 
GDP growth (real) % yoy 4.1 7.9 6.3 7.3 -7.1 -2 1.7 
Industry % GDP 35.2 35.9 36.7 36.7 36.7 38 38.8 
Unemployment 
rate % 5.9 5.2 4 4.4 7.8 7.4 8 
CPI % yoy 9 6.6 4.8 7.8 5.6 6.2 5.5 
Exports USD bn 27.7 32.3 40.6 49.8 40.7 44.8 49.3 
Exports % yoy 18.1 16.6 25.4 22.7 -18.2 10 10 
Imports USD bn 37.3 47.2 65.1 77.9 50.2 55.7 62.4 
Imports % yoy 23.9 26.3 38.1 19.7 -35.6 11 12 
Trade balance USD bn -9.6 -14.8 -24.6 -28.2 -9.5 -10.9 -13.1 
Current account USD bn -8.6 -12.8 -23.1 -23.7 -7.3 -9.2 -12.1 
Current account % GDP -8.7 -10.4 -13.5 -11.6 -4.5 -5.8 -7.2 
FDI (net) USD bn 6.5 11.8 10.2 14.2 6.5 6.6 7.9 
External debt USD bn 36.5 54.3 86.1 101.3 113.3 113.8 128 
External debt % GDP 36.8 44.2 50.4 49.6 70.3 72 76 
Fiscal balance % GDP -1.2 -2.2 -2.6 -5.7 -8.6 -7.6 -6 
Total public debt % GDP 15.8 12.4 12.6 13.4 23.9 31.4 35.8 
Source:  www.dbresearch.com  
     Total  external  debt  grew  by  more  than  45%  in  2006  as  against  2005  and  this  being  entirely  
due  to  the  private  sector.  
   The  transition  years  of  high  inflation  ended  in  2004,  being  sustained  by  a  prudent  fiscal  policy  
and  currency  appreciation.    In  2006,  the  inflation  dropped  significantly  as  a  result  of  tighter  monetary  
and  fiscal  policy.  This  aspect  was  demonstrated  by  the  evolution  of  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI)  that  
decreased  from  9%  yoy  in  2005  to  6.6%  in  2006.    
   Being   given   the   sustained   growth   in   the   Romanian   economical   environment   and   the  
argument   that   developing   and   emerging   economies   are   not   financially   integrated   with   the   world  
system,   consequently   these   economies   not   being   contaminated,   the   signals   received   from   the  
international   markets   were   not   taken   seriously.   This   situation   was   doubled   by   the   Romanian  
authorities’  optimism  (Zaman,  2009)  with  respect   to   the  possible   impact  of   the  global  economy  on  
country’s   financial   system  and   real   economy  due   to   the  parliamentary  elections   that   took  place  at  
the  end  of  2008.  
   The  showed  optimism  was  obviously  unjustified  as  Romanian  economy  is  part  of  the  global  
flows  and  was  bound  to  be  affected  to  a  certain  extent  by  the  turmoil  on  the  external  markets.  The  
manifestation   of   the   crisis   in   Romania   can   be   characterized   through   two   perspectives   (Donath,  
Cismas,   2009):   from   a   financial   one   and   from   the   real   economy’s   outputs   perspective.   From   the  
financial   point   of   view,   Romanian   markets   don’t   have   strong   connections   with   the   US   and   UK  
markets  that  were  most  affected  by  the  crisis.  Also,  it  can  be  said  that  the  Romanian  market  doesn’t  
have  the  capacity,  nor  the  structure  to  deal  with  complex  financial  instruments,  in  this  way  not  being  
extensively   exposed   to   the   respective   toxic   assets   that   stood   at   the   origin   of   crisis.   The   narrow  
financial   market   represented   a   factor   against   the   contagiousness   of   the   crisis   as   there   were   few  
companies   listed   at   the   Bucharest   Stock   Exchange   and   the   volume   of   transactions   was   very   low.    
Furthermore,  the  banking  system  stands  at  the  core  of  funding  process  of  the  firms  and  individuals,  
being  closely  supervised  by   the  National  Bank  of  Romania   (NBR).   In   this   sense,   in  order   to  prevent  
any   negative   outcome   resulting   from   the   dispersion   of   systemic   risk,   NBR   implemented   a   tight  
monetary  policy,  implying  high  reserve  requirements  that  acted  as  protection  for  bank  encountering  
temporary   liquidity  gaps.  The  prudential  measures  proved  their  efficiency   in  keeping  under  control  
the  money  supply,  and  consequently  the  inflation  rate,  preventing  the  banking  system  to  encounter  
major  problems.  
   From  the  other  perspective,  the  negative  effects  of  the  crisis  occurring  in  the  real  economy.  
The  effects  of   the   financial  markets’   lack  of   credibility  were  seen   in   the   increased  costs   implied  by  
loans,   as   most   of   the   loans   were   denominated   in   foreign   currencies.   More   expensive   funding  
determined  a  decreasing  trend  in  the  housing  market  and  in  the  inflow  of  FDI,  putting  in  danger  the  
funding  of  the  already  high  current  deficit.  Being  a  part  of  the  global  economy,  the  country’s  exports  
value   were   affected,   with   consequences   on   the   level   of   production,   unemployment   rate   and  
exchange  rate.  
   In   figures,   from   2009,   the   contraction   of   Romania’s   economy   started   and   deepened,   GDP  
decreasing   by   7.1%   yoy   in   2009   and,   respectively,   by   2%   yoy   in   2010.   On   the   demand   side,   final  
consumption   and   gross   fixed   capital   formation   were   registered   decreasing   values.   The   final  
consumption  was  1.4%  lower  in  2010  compared  to  2009,  while  gross  fixed  capital  formation  dropped  
by  13.7%  yoy.    
   After  a  18.2%  yoy  decrease  in  2009  caused  by  the  turbulences  in  all  segments  of  international  
economies,  exports  remained  he  main  factor  driving  the  Romanian  economy,  registering  an  increase  
of  10%  yoy  in  2010,  in  this  way  helping  to  keep  the  overall  economy  not  to  collapse.  
   As  seen  from  the  above  figures,  in  2009-­‐2010  the  fiscal  balance  registered  increasing  deficits  
of  8.6%  yoy,  respectively  7.6%.  The  figures  are  explained  through  the  management  of  public  money  
characterized  by  the  absence  of  sustainable  fiscal  position  and  waste  of  money.  Government  failed  in  
finance   productive   investments   (infrastructure,   social   protection   and   human   development)   and   in  
meeting  its  own  debts  toward  private  firms,  channeling  funds  toward  loss  making  areas.  
   The   gross  public   debt   registered   increasing   values   from  23.9%  of  GDP   in   2009   to  31.4%  of  
GDP  in  2010,  caused  by  higher  borrowings  of  the  government.    
   In   order   to   understand   the   crisis   effects   on   real   economy,   a   closer   analysis   is   going   to   be  
done  on  three  fundamental  segments:  consumption,  banking  and  real  estate  sectors.  
    
	   3.  Empirical  evidence  
     
   In  order  to  understand  in  depth  the  effects  of  the  financial  crisis,  the  following  chapters  will  
describe   the   changes   registered   in   three   fundamental   correlated   aspects:   the   consumer   behavior,  
the  lending  activity  and  the  real  estate  market  in  Romania.    
   The   personal   interpretations   were   made   upon   processed   data   and   tables,   with   the   basic  
information  coming   from  National  Bank  of  Romania   (NBR),  National   Institute  of  Statistics   (NIS)  and  
various  country  and  market  reports.  
   In  the  next  section  were  made  the  following  calculations:  
-­‐ The  annual  values  for  private  consumption  were  determined  as  an  average  of  monthly  values  
from  2000  to  2009  coming  from  the  reports  supplied  by  NIS;  
-­‐ The  calculation  regarding  the  changes  made  upon  the  GDP  components,  respectively   in  the  
private   consumption   and   the   financing   sources  were   done   yoy,   using   the   formula   (PM/2009-­‐
PM/2008)/PM/2008  upon  basic  data  supplied  by  NBR;  
-­‐ The  annual  values  of  the  PCI,  investment  and  saving  rates  were  obtained  from  the  average  of  
monthly   values   between   2007   and   2009;   the   inflation   rate   was   determined   using   the  
formula:  Inflation  rate=PCI-­‐100;    
-­‐ In   order   to   have   a   better   view   of   the   evolution   of   certain   indicators   (unemployment   rate,  
dynamics  of   interest  rates  for  consumption  loans  in  EUR  and  RON)  were  used  charts  drawn  
upon  tables  attached  as  appendixes;  
   In  banking  part  all   the  calculations  were  made  upon  a  data  base  regarding  all  categories  of  
loans   in   EUR   and   RON,   respectively   on   deposits,   both   attached   as   appendixes   to   this   paper.   In  
general,  the  calculations  consisted  of  sums  (as  total  loans  in  EUR/RON),  proportions  and  percentage  
increases/decreases.  As  it  will  be  seen,  charts  were  drawn  upon  tables  for  a  better  representation  of  
changes  and  influences  in  the  chosen  indicators.  
   Regarding   the   Real   Estate   market   evolution   the   figures,   charts   and   tables   were   obtained  
using   the   data   provided   by   various   real   estate   reports.   Furthermore   there  was   constituted   a   data  
base  with  the  value  of  construction  work  rates  and  issued  building  permits  between  2008  and  2009  
upon  which  various  charts  were  drawn  as  it  will  be  seen  later  on.  
	   4.  The  crisis  impact  on  private  consumption  
   At   a   first   view   and   taking   into   consideration   the   data   provided   by   the   Romania   National  
Institute  of  Statistics,   it  can  be  observed  a  continuous   increase   in  the  value  of  private  consumption  
from  62,402  million  RON  in  2000  to  313,223  million  RON  in  2007,  reaching  a  pick  of  381,063  million  
RON  in  2008  and  starting  to  decline  in  2009  to  a  value  of  357,069  million  RON.  
     
   Source:  www.insse.ro  
   In   his   behavior,   the   consumer   is   confronted   with   certain   restrictions   while   making   his  
choices.  Among   these   restrictions,   two  are   considered  by  economists  as  being   the  most   important  
ones   and   refer   to   the   disposable   income   and   the   level   of   prices   (Dobrota,   1997).   Both   of   these  
indicators   are   influenced   in   their   evolution   by   other   factors   characterizing   the   economical   activity  
like:   level   o   retail   loans,   saving   rate,   inflation,   level   of   unemployment,   level   of   remittances   from  
abroad,  level  of  FDI,  etc.  
As   crisis   is   manifesting,   the   losses   registered   in   all   segments   of   real   economy   have   significant  
negative  effects  on  consumption.  In  a  rough  environment  where  the  conditions  of  crediting  become  
tougher,  many   households   are   constrained   by   no   longer   being   able   to   borrow   against   their   home  
equity.  As  a  natural   consequence,   this   leads   to  a   fall   in   consumption  and  an   increase   in   savings  as  
households   adjust   to   their   new   circumstances.   The   changes   in   consumption   depend   also   on   non-­‐




2000   62,402  
2001   92,177  
2002   116,896  
2003   149,396  
2004   191,499  
2005   226,929  
2006   268,441  
2007   313,223  
2008   381,063  
2009   357,069  












2007T1 10.47 5.50 -9.87 6.10 
2007T2 9.83 5.57 -9.69 5.71 
2007T3 7.29 7.11 -8.72 5.69 
2007T4 7.63 6.48 -7.53 6.58 
2008T1 14.2 1.2 -6.8 8.5 
2008T2 9.5 3.0 -2.9 9.6 
2008T3 13.8 -3.3 -1.1 9.4 
2008T4 -3.2 1.6 4.7 3.1 
2009T1 -8.5 -7.0 9.3 -6.2 
2009T2 -9.8 -8.2 9.2 -8.7 
2009T3 -6.8 -7.6 7.3 -7.1 
2009T4 -3.1 -7.8 4.4 -6.5 
Source:  www.bnro.ro  
   During   the   period   2002-­‐2007,   the   economic   growth   was   driven   by   the   domestic   demand,  
stimulated   on   one   hand   by   the   rise   in   the   household   consumption.   As   seen   from   the   statistics  
presented   above,   the   increase   in   the   consumption   prior   the   crisis   registered   the   highest   values   in  
comparison  to  the  dynamics  of  other  GDP  components,   this  being  explained  by  the   increase   in  the  
net  disposable  income  and  by  the  developments  made  by  the  retail  and  service  sectors.  Thereby  the  
final   consumption  aroused   to  pick   values   in  2007   (first   quarter)   and  2008   (first   and   third  quarter),  
respectively   10,74%yoy   increase,   14.2%yoy   and   13.8%yoy   increase.   Following   the   crisis,   the   final  
consumption  decreased  consistently,  reaching  a  -­‐9.8%yoy  decrease  in  the  second  trimester  of  2009.  
         
   On  components,  the  dynamics  of  the  private  consumption  is  influenced  in  higher  proportion  
by  the  population  consumption,  than  by  the  governmental  one,  the  first  registering  increased  values,  
picking  17.9%yoy   in   the   third   trimester  of  2008  and  negative  evolution   from  the   last  part  of  2008,  
with   the   highest   value   of   -­‐12.8%yoy   in   the   middle   of   2009.   The   negative   evolution   of   private  
consumption   is   given   by   the   influence   of   certain   factors   like:   the   decrease   in   the   dynamics   of  
disposable  incomes,  the  uncertainty  regarding  the  income  (it  was  observed  an  increased  uncertainty  
regarding  the  working  place),  and  from  here  the  tendency  of  increasing  savings.  
   The   transmission   of   the   crisis   wave   was   strongly   done   through   the   finance   channel   with  
impact  on  the  non-­‐governmental  credit  dynamics  as  the  mother-­‐banks  reduced  the  external  private  
credit-­‐lines  toward  the  Romanian  subsidiaries.  This  situation  determined  a  7.9%  yoy  decrease  from  
the  third  semester  of  2008  in  the  new  granted  consumption  loans  ,  reaching  the  highest  decrease  of  -­‐
77.2%  in  the  first  trimester  of  2009.  Consequently,  there  was  docuented  a  continuously  decrease  in  
the  expenses  with  goods  and  services,  with  a  pick  of  -­‐18.4%  yoy  in  the  middle  of  2009.    
Private  consumption  and  financing  sources  
Data  
Expenses  with  








2008T1   15.1 13.3 26.8 
2008T2   17.2 20.2 4.2 
2008T3   16.4 19.0 -7.9 
2008T4   -2.8 15.3 -51.7 
2009T1   -13.4 8.7 -77.2 
2009T2   -18.4 -5.6 -75.7 
2009T3   -18.2 -1.4 -73.3 
2009T4   -12.2 -14.0 -53.6 
2010T1   -6.5 -5.8 12.8 
2010  apr.-­‐may   -4.2 -5.2 35.4 
Source:  www.bnro.ro  
     As   seen   from   the   figures   above,   before   the   crisis   the   consumption   loans   increased   their  
profiles,  becoming  from  2003  to  2005  the  growth  driver  for  lending  activity  being  given  the  fact  that  
households  enjoyed  substantial  purchasing  power  gains.  
   The   effects   of   the   liquidity   crisis   on   the   financial  market   and   on   the   consumption   are   also  
seen  through  the  evolution  of   interest  rates  regarding  the  retail  consumption  loans,   increasing  to  a  
maximum  level  of  24.7%  for  RON  in  the  middle  of  2009,  respectively  12%  for  EUR  at  the  beginning  of  
2009.     
   Despite   the   sever   contraction  of   the  economy,   the   consumer’s   price   index   (an   indicator  of  
the   purchase   power   of   the   consumer)   hadn’t   decreased   drastically,   compared   to   other   European  
countries,   this   being   explained   by   the   external   conditions   like:   the   increase   of   excise   duties,   the  
depreciation   of   the   national   currency,   the   insufficient   adjustment   of   public   expenses   and   the  
inflexibility  characterizing  the  labor  and  product  markets.  
Year   PCI   Inflation  
2005 109,0 9,0 
2006 106,56 6,56 
2007 104,84 4,84 
2008 107,85 7,85 
2009 105,59 5,59 
  Source:  www.insse.ro  
   Another   factor   influencing   in   an   indirect   manner   the   consumption   is   represented   by  
inflexibility  of   the   labor  market   that   reacted   to   the   crisis  manifestation   through  an   increase   in   the  
unemployment  rate  from  an  average  of  4.4%  in  2008,  to  7.8%  in  2009  and  through  a  slowing  in  the  
salaries  increase  level,  from  a  level  of  more  than  20%  in  2008  to  1.9%  in  2009.    
    
   While  in  the  private  sector  there  were  massive  reductions  of  personnel,  in  the  public  sector  
the   decrease   in   the   employees’   number   was   a   marginal   one,   the  measures   of   limiting   the   public  
expenditures  being   related   to   the  bonuses   removals  and   imposed  days  off   (Erste  Report,  2007).   In  
2009,  the   labor  productivity  on  overall  economy  decreased  with  5.9%,  following  an  annual  average  
increase  of  7.1%  between  2003  and  2008,  constructions  field  being  the  most  affected  in  this  sense.  
Another   influence   in   the   decrease   of   labor   productivity   was   attributed   to   the   lack   of   measures  
regarding   the   personnel   reduction   in   the   public   domain.   Being   given   these,   the   negative   gap  
registered  previous   years  between   the   labor  productivity  dynamics   and   the   annual   increase   in   the  
salaries   was   maintained   at   a   considerable   level:   -­‐14.3%   compared   with   an   average   of   -­‐16.2%  
between  2007  and  2008.      
   The  turbulences  in  the  labor  market  are  influenced  by  the  decreasing  dynamics  of  the  FDIs,  
explained  by  the  increased  aversion  of  foreign  investors  regarding  the  emerging  markets,  with  effects  
on  investments.  In  2009,  it  was  registered  a  decrease  in  the  foreign  corporate’  exposure  toward  the  
domestic  banking  system  (aprox.  5%),  in  favor  of  external  financing  (aprox.  20%).  
     Being   given   the   above   analyzed   turbulences   and   the   uncertainty   in   all   areas   of   Romanian  
economy,   the   population   had   a   tendency   in   increasing   their   savings,   the   saving   rate   registering  






2007   28.71   14.04  
2008   30.33   16.9  
2009   24.48   18.4  
  Source:  www.bnro.ro  
   According   to   a   survey   led   by   the   research   company   GfK,   in   2010   Romanian   household  
consumption  fell  by  5.0%  in  the  first  nine  months  of  the  year  as  people  adapted  their  buying  habits  
to  the  economical  environment.  The  basic   food  segment  was  the   least  affected  by  the  expenditure  
decrease,   dropping   by   3.0%   in   January-­‐September.   Home-­‐made   products,   which   cover   22%   of  
essential   food   value,   being   seen   as   a   good   alternative   to   cope   with   the   crisis   and   sustain   the  
consumption.   Non-­‐food   non-­‐essential   products   registered   the   highest   decrease   in   value   terms   of  
more  than  9.0%,  the  main  reason  being  the  smaller  purchasing  frequency.  
   As  seen  from  the  above  analysis,  consumption  represents  a  complex  and  fundamental  notion  
upon  which  the  economy’  s  revival  depends.  The  consumption  can  be  seen  as  a  function  of  several  
interconnected   variables   strongly   affected   by   crisis:   the   level   of   diposable   income,   unemplyment  
rate,  inflation  level,  crediting  level.  
	   5.  Crisis  effects  on  banking/loans  
  
   In   the   early   2000,   following   a   period   of   deep   restructuring,   as   experienced   by   all   other  
countries   in   the   region,   the  banking   sector   started   to   stabilize  and  grow  on   the  background  of   the  
economic   recovery.   Growth   in   foreign   capital   inflows   (privatization   and   green   fields)   and  
consolidation  of  the  supervisory  role  of  NBR  were  the  main  stability  drivers  with  effects  on  regaining  
customers’   confidence.   Talking   about   a   growing   economy,   the   inflow   coming   from  FDIs   supported  
healthy  developments  in  terms  of  infrastructure,  products  and  risk  management,  with  a  more  active  
central  bank  succeeding  to  improve  regulations  and  market  discipline  
   Correlated  with  a   robust  economic  growth,   in   the   recent  years  Romania  posted  one  of   the  
highest  speed  rates  of  lending  development  in  the  region  (UniCredit  Group,  2009).  
   In   2003   it   was   created   the   regulatory   environment   for   the   mortgage   lending,   retail   loans  
registering  a  considerable  jump,  growing  by  3  times  against  previous  year.  The  specific  movement  of  
this  year  was   the   result  of   long-­‐time  postponed  consumption   that  pushed  up  households’  demand  
for  loans.    
   Between   2005   and   2008,   households   enjoyed   significant   purchasing   power   gains   due   to  
factors   like:  wages   increase,   labor  market   development,   income   tax   reduction.   In   this  way,   higher  
competition  combined  with  a  disinflation  process   led   to   interest   rates  decrease,  easing  customers’  
access  to  banking  loans.    
   Regarding   the  corporate   loans   it  had  been  registered  a  more  stable  development  with   real  
annual   growth   rates   of   about   21%   until   2006   (National   Bank   of   Romania,   2008,   2009).   2007  
represented   the   year   of   Romania’s   EU   integration,   this   being   translated   into   an   increase   in  
companies’  demand  for  loans  in  order  to  support  certain  investments.    
   From   2007,   the   international   economy   passed   a   period   marked   by   increased   tensions  
determined  by  the  slowing  of  the  economy  growth  and  by  the  assets  price  correction,  generating  a  
feeling   of   distrust   from   investors   and   significantly   increased   risk   aversion.   The   2007   financial  
instabilities   transformed   in   2008   into   crisis,   becoming   severe   into   2009   and   affecting   the   world  
economic  growth.  
   In   Romania   the  main   issues   arousing   from   the   crisis   dispersion   refer   to   the   increased   risk  
aversion,   international  markets  contractions,  more  difficult  external   financing  and   the   replacement  
of  the  global  liquidity  risk  with  the  solvability  one.    
   The   risk   aversion   manifested   in   the   developed   countries,   expanded   rapidly   toward   the  
emergent  markets   determining   general   economic  decrease,   a   slowdown  of   FDI,   an   increase   in   the  
unemployment  rate,  adjustments  in  the  current  account  and  fiscal  deficits.  
   In  2008  in  Romania,  the  access  to  liquidity  became  more  difficult  and  more  expensive  due  to  
the  reluctance  of  the  international  creditors  in  providing  financial  funds,  the  government  competing  
with   the   private   sector   for   resources   and   the   rating   agencies   downgrading   the   country   under  
“investment  grade”.5  
   Given   the   above   described   environment,   2009  was   characterized   by   the   credit   supply   and  
demand   contraction,   determining   a   disruption   in   the   credit   activity’s   upward   trend.   Thereby,  
according   to   the  NBR   figures,   in  2009  there  was  documented  a  modest   increasing  evolution  of   the  
non-­‐governmental  credit  (0.9%  in  nominal  terms,  -­‐3.6%  real  terms)  compared  with  a  2008  dynamics  
of   +33.7%   nominal   terms,   respectively   +25.8%   real.   The   unstable   economy   and   the   depreciating  
national  currency,  determined  a  change  in  the  non-­‐governmental  credit  structure,  the  loans  granted  




   An   important   characteristic   of   2008   was   that   a   large   proportion   of   the   new   loans   were  
granted  with  promotional  interests,  postponing  for  future  years  an  increased  service  debt.    
   In  this  sense,  a  deterioration  of  the  credit  portfolio  quality  was  observed,  with  the  exposure  
of   credit   and   interests   with   over   90   days   delay   (and/or   for   which   judicial   procedures   started)  
increasing   from   2.8%in   overall   portfolio   in   2008   to   7.9%   in   December   2009.   This   unfavorable  
situation   led   banks   into   making   on   one   hand   a   massive   provision   increase   for   covering   the   non-­‐
performing   loans   and,   on   the   other   hand,   to   adopt   a   more   prudential   position   in   approving   new  
loans.  This   is  being   translated   into  higher  collateral/guarantees   requests,   the  crediting  costs   (other  
                                                                                                                          
5  S&P  and  Fitch  rating  agencies  attributed  to  Romania  BB+  with  negative  perspective,  while  Moody’s  
considered  a  Baa3  rating,  with  stable  perspectives;  
than  the  interest  rates)   increased  in  a  higher   level,  higher  prime  for  more  riskier  credits,  decreased  
limit  for  credit  limits,  more  restrictive  contractual  clauses,  decreased  credit  period.  
   Another   indicator   that   shows   the   influence   of   the   crisis   on   banking,   generally,   and   on  
crediting,  particularly,  is  represented  by  the  liquidity  indicator6  that  diminished  from  2.47  in  2008  to  
1.38  in  2009.  This  was  explained  by  the  change  in  the  banks’  strategy  that  concentrated  in  2009  on  
attracting   deposits,   while   decreasing   lending.   Following   this   strategy,   the   ratio   credits   granted   to  








Liquity ratio 38.70 N/A 34.43 N/A 35.28 N/A 
Due loans/Total portfolio value 0.22 0.3 0.32 1.03 1.45 2.17 
Loans to deposits 108.72 119.64 122.03 119.23 112.8 117.46 
Total value of doubtul and loss loans 
and interests/ 
Total portfolio value of loans and 
interests 
4 4.71 6.52 11.76 15.29 17.81 
Loans and interests considered 
losses/ 
total portfolio value of loans and 
interests 
N/A N/A 2.8 N/A 7.89 10.2 
  
   The   annual   dynamics   of   the   individual   loans   extended   its   descendent   trajectory   started   in  
February  2008,  entering   in   the   last  part  of  2009  on  a  negative  pattern,   registering  values  of   -­‐3%   in  
December  2009  in  comparison  to  end  of  2008.  The  decrease  in  this  segment  surpassed  the  decrease  
registered  in  corporate  lending  (1.96%  in  December  2009  toward  the  end  of  2008).    
   The  increase  in  the  lending  level  before  the  crisis  manifestation  was  a  cause  of  an  increased  
competition  among  banks  on  the  basis  of  individuals’  increased  incomes.  
   The   figures   expressed   above   were   significantly   affected   by   determinants   constituting   the  
credit  demand  and  supply.   In  this  sense,  the  credit  demand  was   influenced  by  factors  as  following:  
the   population’s   uncertainty   regarding   the   working   place,   respectively   their   incomes,   too   high  
indebtedness  rate  for  population,  banks  maintaining  at  high  levels  the  interest  rates  for  new/already  
existing  loans.  Regarding  the  credit  supply,  the  main  drivers  of  its  descending  evolution  were:  banks  
adopting  a  prudent  policy  due  to  bad  expectations  regarding  the  financial  markets,  increasing  risk  of  
adverse  selection,  the  client’s  risk  profile  reevaluation,  more  difficult  access  to  external  financing  for  
financial   institutions,   consolidation   of   the   liquidity’s   net   position   in   the   banking   system,   the  
reorientation  of  the  respective  financial  institutions  toward  investments  with  higher  liquidity  grade.  
                                                                                                                          
6  The  liquidity  indicator  is  calculated  as  a  ratio  between  the  effective  liquidity  and  the  necessary  liquidity;  
   Under   the   impact  of   the  above   factors,  all   credit  categories   registered  decreasing  patterns,  
the  most  affected  ones  being  the  consumption  loans  with  -­‐1.15%  yoy  in  December  2009,  compared  
to  +33.74%  yoy  in  2008.  The  mortgage  loans  reduced  their  dynamics  by  31.4  percentage  points  but  
remained   in   a   positive   area,   increasing   with   15.9%   yoy   in   December   2009   (the   yoy   increase   in  
December  2008  was  47.37%),  this  being  mainly  explained  by  the  start  of  the  governmental  program  











Jun-07 38,968,473,788   9,116,016,527   
Dec-07 55,239,015,971   14,246,602,990   
Jun-08 65,669,206,349   17,394,285,075   
Dec-08 73,875,131,680 33.74% 20,990,704,564 47.34% 
Jun-09 74,111,646,382   22,379,003,143   
Dec-09 73,024,768,067 -1.15% 24,328,031,086 15.90% 
Jun-10 67,948,700,000   27,932,900,000   
  
   Regarding   the   currency   in  which   the   loans  were   granted,   the   year   2009  marked   divergent  
evolutions   it   was   encountered   a   5%   yoy   increase   in   EUR   loans   in   December   2009   compared   to   a  
41.51%   yoy   increase   in   2008,   and   a   -­‐4.73%   yoy   decrease   in   2009,   against   23.38%   yoy   increase   in  
2008.   The   explanation   stands   in   the   stability   of   Euro   currency,   compared   to   the   national   one,  
translated  into  lower  costs.  
                                                                                                                          
7  Public  program  that  permits  to  people  without  houses  to  buy  at  low  prices,  with  loans  at  low  interest  rate,  
guaranteed  by  the  state;  
  Data Total loans EUR (equiv RON) 









56,962,583,317   
Dec-07 81,264,016,613 
 
67,300,794,157   
Jun-08 98,500,292,109 
 
79,474,806,592   




 Dec-09 121,005,098,674 5.23% 79,107,469,619 -4.73% 
Jun-10 133,103,500,000   71,712,250,000   
  
   As  consequence,  if  in  previous  years  the  EUR  loan  had  a  tendency  of  equalizing  the  RON  loan  
as   percentage   in   total   non-­‐governmental   loans,   in   2009   the   lag   between   those   two  became   lager.  
Thus,  at  the  end  of  December  2009,  the  EUR  loans  value  represented  60.1%  in  the  total  amount  of  
credits,  and  the  RON  loans  registered  a  39.53%,  while  at  the  end  of  2008  the  difference  between  the  
two  indicators  was  16.14  percentage  points  (59.41%  toward  40.59%).  
Data Total EUR loans (equiv RON) 




%total RON loans/ 
total loans 
Jun-07 52,187,865,308 47.81% 56,962,583,317 52.19% 
Dec-07 81,264,016,613 54.70% 67,300,794,157 45.30% 
Jun-08 98,500,292,109 55.34% 79,474,806,592 44.66% 
Dec-08 114,995,838,975 58.07% 83,036,000,994 41.93% 
Jun-09 117,618,569,492 59.41% 80,375,589,076 40.59% 
Dec-09 121,005,098,674 60.47% 79,107,469,619 39.53% 
Jun-10 133,103,500,000 64.99% 71,712,250,000 35.01% 
  
   In   2009,   the   population’s   money   demand   for   prudential   purposes   (saving)   increased  
dramatically  on  a  pessimistic  background  determined  by  the  present  and  expected  financial  situation  
deterioration.  The  deposits  under  2  years   registered   increasing   trends   in  yoy  comparison  –   in   June  
2009  toward  June  2008,  the  EUR  deposits   increased  by  47%,  while  the  RON  ones  by  37%,  reaching  
pick  level  in  the  crisis  period.  








Jun-08 16.27% 56.50% 
Dec-08 13.68% 31.09% 
Jun-09 36.46% 46.85% 
Dec-09 26.63% 46.47% 
Jun-10 12.94% 14.05% 
  
   According   to   the  NBR   reports,   the   indebtedness   rate   recorded  worrying   level   and   the   loan  
portfolio   of   the   banks   deteriorated,   the   non-­‐performing   loans   increasing   from   2.4%   in   December  
2008  to  6.1%  in  2009.  The  net  wealth  of  the  population  decreased  in  2009  with  10%  caused  by  the  
price  effect  of  the  non-­‐financial  assets  (real  estate).  Also,  this  was  affected  by  the  faster  depreciation  
of   the  purchased  assets’  sales  value  compared  with  the  credit  amortization   (contracted   in  order  to  
buy   the   respective   assets),   this   being   translated   into   a   potential   danger   –   the   debtors   not   being  
preoccupied  to  repay  the  loans.  
   The  year  2009  marked  also  negative  evolutions   in  the  real  estate  sector,  respectively   in  the  
real   estate   assets.   The   credit   portfolio   quality   coming   from   the   mortgage   crediting   has   been  
deteriorating  from  1%  non-­‐performing  loans  in  2008  to  4.75%  in  2009,  due  to  a  high  decrease  in  the  
properties’  prices  that  were  mortgaged.  
	   6.  The  crisis  effects  on  real  estate  segment  
  
   One  of  the  most  crisis-­‐affected  areas  of  real  economy,  with  deep  implications  on  the  existing  
companies,  households’  net  wealth  and  crediting  is  the  real  estate  market.  
   Starting  from  2002,  with  the  advantage  of  high  margins  provided  by  the  real  estate  markets,  
local  and  international  companies  started  constructing  office  buildings  and  other  facilities  in  order  to  
support  the  business  sector  growth.  Thus,  as  seen  in  the  figure  below,  the  market  started  increasing  
its   pace   of   growth   in   2002,   with   picks   in   2007-­‐2008,   from   2009   going   through   a   high   decreasing  
period  caused  by  the  crisis  manifestation.  
  
   The   investors’   confidence   in   the   Romanian  market   increased   once  with   the   completion   in  
2003   of   the   first   two   institutional   investments   that   accounted   for   transaction   values   of   60  million  
EUR.  
   In  figures,  the  office  market   in  Bucharest8  was  characterized  as  follows.  At  the  beginning  of  
2008,  the  total  stock  of  office  premises  delivered  on  the  Bucharest  market  was  reaching  950,000  sq  
m,   whilst   by   the   end   of   the   year,   this   real   estate   segment   reported   important   new   deliveries   of  
240,000  sq  m  bringing  the  total  stock  at  around  1,190,000  sq  m  (Q4,  2008).  
   From  2009,   on   the   background  of   the   financial   turmoil,   the   demand   for   new  office   spaces  
decreased  significantly,  registering  a  historical  value  of  130,000  sq  m  (net  take-­‐up)  in  2009,  below  the  
highest  value  recorded  in  2008  of  270,000  sq  m.  Simultaneously,  the  level  of  new  supply  reached  the  
highest   value   within   the   last   5   years   of   around   330,000   sq   m.   By   the   end   of   2009,   due   to   the  
                                                                                                                          
8  Due  to  its  size,  infrastructure  and  resources  Bucharest  represents  the  first  step  of  foreign  companies  in  
Romania  
economic  instability,  contracting  the  companies’  activity,  the  vacancy  rate  reached  16.6%,  further  to  
an  8  times  increase  when  compared  to  year  2007  value.  
   As  a  consequence  of  difficult  access  to  funding  and  increased  availability,  for  the  future  the  
real   estate   companies   (CRBE-­‐Eurisko,   2009)   activating   in   the  market   forecast   a   significantly   lower  
annual  new  office  supply,  estimated  to  reach  only  96,800  sq  m,  further  to  a  fall  of  64%  year-­‐on-­‐year.  
   The  level  of  demand  and  supply  in  the  real  estate  office  market  can  be  measured  through  the  
level  of  prime   rents.   In   this   sense,   the   rents   for   the  office  market   registered   their  highest   value   in  
2008,  when  spaces  within  prime  properties  reached  the  level  of  €25-­‐26  per  sq  m  per  month  (More  
Real  Estate,  2010).  
   From  2009   to  2010,   the  prime  headline   rents  were   situated  between  €18-­‐20  per   sq  m  per  
month   for   the   central   area,   €14-­‐17  per   sq  m  per  month   for   semi   central   locations  whilst   rents   for  
decentralized  business  districts  were  in  range  of  €9-­‐13  per  sq  m  per  month.  
   Another   component   of   real   estate  market   that  was   heavily   influenced   by   the   crisis   spread  
consists   from   the   residential   market.   In   2007   the   residential   market   in   Romania   was   marked   by  
extraordinary  rises.  After  reaching  a  peak  in  Q4  2007,  the  debut  of  2008  registered  stagnation  of  the  
volumes  transacted,  and  at  the  end  of  the  first  semester  of  this  year  a  sensible  regress  of  the  market  
was  felt  on  certain  segments.  
   The  explanation  of  this  dynamics  of  the  residential  market  is  very  much  connected  with  the  
behavior  of  the  big  investors  in  the  market,  and  less  with  that  of  the  end  users.  
   The  diminution  of  the   investors’  activity   in  2008  made  place  to  classical  transactions,  giving  
to  a  certain  extent  the  measure  of  the  natural  rhythm  of  the  market.  Those  who  made  acquisitions  in  
2008  were  in  fact  the  end  users  of  the  residential  projects.  
   There   are   several   factors,   both   internal   and   external,   that   led   to   the   above   described  
behavior  of  the  real  estate  market   in  Romania.  Retrospectively,  before  the  market  deterioration,   in  
Bucharest,   certain   real   estate   segments   registered   annual   increases   of   up   to   20   –   25   percent,   the  
demand  was  high,  and   those   that   invested   in   these  products  collected  considerable   returns.  Those  
that  acquired  large  packages  of  real  estate  products   in  view  of  re-­‐selling  them  afterwards,  or  those  
that   begun   residential   developments   on   basis   of   a   business   plan   that   had   as   reference   point   the  
market  situation  in  2006-­‐2007  have  found  out  that  the  acquisition  possibilities  of  the  staple  end  user  
have  diminished.   It   is  not   the  demand  that  has  diminished,  but   the  possibility  of   the  Romanians  to  
afford   the  new  conditions  of   financing  an  acquisition.  The  developers,  as  well  as   those   that  had   in  
mind  to  acquire  large  portfolios,  faced  more  restrictive  standards  for  credits  (banks  asking  for  larger  
collaterals   supporting   the   exposures   and   applying   higher   interest   rates).   The   banking   system   has  
made   almost   every   month   changes   in   the   interest   rates   and   of   the   conditions   of   granting   loans,  
resulting  in  the  stagnation  of  the  market.  Since  September  2008,  together  with  the  financial  situation  
on   the   international   market,   the   access   to   credits   has   become   increasingly   difficult,   both   for   the  
public  at  large  and  for  the  developers.  
   The  turmoil  within  international  financial  markets  has  started  to  show  repercussions  on  the  
Romanian   real   estate   market   with   severe   effects   for   the   residential   segment.   This   has   caused   a  
marked   reduction   in   the   volume   of   transactions  with   activity   below   the   level   of   recent   years   and  
downturn   adjustment   of   the   prices   to   a   peak   of   45%.   Moreover,   at   the   end   of   2008   due   to   an  
unstable   environment,   the   development   portfolio   suffered   reconfigurations   with   development  
projects  being  dissolved  and  construction  process  being  suspended.   In   this   sense,  developers  were  
willing  to  finalize  only  the  most  advanced  construction  works,  whilst  the  planned  developments  were  
suspended.    
   In  the  last  quarter  of  2008  the  government  implemented  measures  (JL  LaSalle,  2010)  aiming  
to  stimulate  the  demand  for  purchasing  new  dwellings  as  follows:  *5%cut  in  the  VAT  level,  *the  start  
of  the  governmental  program  “First  House”.  
  
Indicator Mar-08 Jan-10 
3 room apartment price 
(eur) 120,000 70,000 
Down payment (eur) 
12-
18,000 13,000 
Interest (%) 7 4.7 
Monthly installment** 597 350 
** First House program, Bank: BRD-GSC 
     
   In   2006–2008,   the   prices   were   not   reflecting   the   purchasing   power   of   the   Bucharest  
population,   surpassing   the   average   income   of   an   inhabitant   by   30   to   40%.   The   demand   was  
estimated  to  reach  hundreds  of  thousands  of  units  and  this  is  only  in  the  case  of  Bucharest  City.  The  
reality   was   that   only   few   people   were   qualified   for   purchasing   a   newly   developed   flat.   This  
discrepancy   led  to  an   investors  market  or  to  one   led  by  private   individuals  having  the  possibility  of  
such  an  investment  or  saving  and  not  to  an  end-­‐user  market.  If  at  the  beginning  of  2008,  the  demand  
for   new   residential   units   in   Bucharest  was   coming  mainly   from  private   investors,  with   the  market  
contracting  the  power  has  shifted  towards  the  end-­‐user.  
   In   terms   of   volume   of   sales,   the   residential   segment   has   registered   significant   decreases  
starting  with  Q2  2008  in  this  context  the  first  discounts  appeared  (when  it  comes  to  parking/kitchen  
furniture  included  in  the  price  of  the  apartment,  discount  of  24%  representing  the  VAT).  The  asking  
prices  for  the  newly  developed  units  have  registered  significant  decreases  starting  from  5  to  10%  in  
the  first  phase  and  currently  reaching  a  maximum  of  35  –  40%  (for  the  central  areas)  and  up  to  50  –  
55%  (in  the  case  of  the  peripheral  areas  as  the  northern  ones)  (King  Sturge,  2008).  
   Regarding   the   future   evolution   of   residential   prices   it   is   assumed   that   the   general   level   of  
prices   have   already   reached   a   resistance   threshold,   of   approximately   40-­‐45%,   lower   than   the  
maximum  values  reached  in  the  first  half  of  2008  (DTZ-­‐Echinox,  2011).  This  resistance  threshold  has  
been   generated   by   the   overall   LTV   ratio   of   68%   on   the   Romanian   market.   A   pessimist   scenario  
implies   the   surpassing   of   this   threshold   and   the   reach   of   50%   level   of   decrease  while   an   optimist  
scenario   assumes   the   maintaining   of   the   current   level   of   prices   along   the   remainder   of   2010,  
followed  by  a  slight  decrease  for  2011.  
	   7.  Measures  taken  in  order  to  diminish  the  crisis  impact    
     
   According  to  Minzen  (2008)  and  Lin  (2008)  in  their  research  papers,  the  current  crisis  differs  
from   the   previous   ones   through   the   contagion   speed   and   the   inter-­‐linkages   among   the   world’s  
financial  firms  and  sectors.  In  this  sense,  it  is  important  for  the  developing  countries  (Romania  case)  
to  take  quick,  decisive  and  systematic  measures  (Lin,  2008)  and  to  implement  coordinated  policies  in  
order  to  minimize  the  effects  of  the  crisis  manifestation.    
   Opposite  to  the  emerging  markets’  situation,  the  wealthy  countries  need  to  take  advantage  
of  their  more  stable  economical  position  and  more  developed  institutional  structures  in  order  to  find  
an  agreement  on  how  to  move  forward9.  
   Generally,   developing   countries   governments   have   two   main   macroeconomic   tools   for  
responding  to  the  implied  negative  consequences:  monetary  policy  and  fiscal  policy  (Vacarel,  2004).  
On   the   fiscal-­‐policy   side,   among   the   tools   that   might   be   used,   can   be   mentioned   the   following:    
implementing   fiscal   tools   to   generate   the   already   affected   domestic   demand,   stimulating   public  
investments   (Zaman,   2009)   like:   building   infrastructure   (the   case   when   the   private-­‐sector   growth  
surpassed  the  ability  of  the  public  sector  to  support  the  growth),  developments  in  social  protection  
and  human  development   (in  order   for   the  temporary  shock  not  to  become  a  permanent  decline   in  
the  wealth  of  poorer  households).  
   The  respective  policies  are  chosen  taking  into  consideration  certain  economic  characteristics  
of  the  developed  countries  as  the  reserve  levels,  current  account  surplus/deficit,  debt  levels,  inflation  
level,   the   ability   to   respond   to   the   crisis   depending   on   the   room   the   markets   have   to   increase  
domestic  demand  without  cutting  excessively  in  other  parts  of  economy.  
   Besides   the   countries   themselves,   the   international   financial   institutions   (International  
Monetary  Funds,  World  Bank,   IFC)  provided  assistance  in  the  form  of   loans,  grants  with  the  goal  of  
supporting  structural,  social,  financial  areas  with  influences  on  the  economies’  equilibrium.      
   In  the  Romania  case,  the  governmental  measures  taken  in  order  to  combat  the  crisis  effects  
were  related  to:  
-­‐ The   institutional   aspect   -­‐      in   this   sense   the   National   Committee   of   Financial   Stability  
(NCFS)was   created  with   the   specific   target  of  proposing   solutions   for  diminishing   the   crisis  
effects,   and   ministerial   working   groups   in   charge   of   implementing   anti-­‐crisis   measures  
adopted  by  the  government;  
                                                                                                                          
9  According  Minzen  (2008),  since  the  full-­‐blown  crisis  from  September,  the  EU  and  US  governments  have  
moved  further  and  faster  than  would  have  predicted  to  adopt  dramatically  expanded  government  roles  in  the  
financial  sector;    
-­‐ The  strategic  part  –   it  was  adopted  an  anti-­‐crisis  program  consisting  of  23  policy  measures  
divided   in   three  main   categories:   economic   (goal:   to   stimulate   the   economic   recovery   and  
growth),  financial  (goal:  to  increase  liquidity  in  the  system),  social  measures  (goal:  to  support  
the  social  categories  with  lower  income  more  affected  by  crisis).  
   Despite   the  above  adopted  measures,  not   all   proved   to  be  appropriate   to  offset   the   crisis,  
especially   the   ones   in   the   social   area.   A   big   issue   in   the  Romanian   economy   is   determined  by   the  
public   money   mismanagement   backed   by   a   lack   of   sustainable   fiscal   position,   these   having  
dramatically   effects   in   establishing   a   macroeconomic   balance.   This   is   translated   through   a   public  
policy  that  is  choosing  the  financed  activities  on  performance  and  efficiency  criteria.  
   Up  to  this  moment,  the  government  failed  to  finance  productive  investments  (infrastructure)  
channeling   funds   toward   loss  making   areas,   contributing   to   the   deepening   of   the   crisis   instead   of  
using  its  tools  to  boost  the  economic  activity.  
   According  to  NBR  in  the  2009  Annual  Report,  Romania  is  still  an  attractive  country  for  foreign  
investors  but  investments  in  the  infrastructure  expansion  become  mandatory.  
   In   an   environment   characterized   by   inflationary   pressures,   risk   of   high   exchange   rate  
volatility  and  non-­‐sustaining  macroeconomic  indicators  (high  deficits),  the  Central  Bank  implemented  
certain  measures  in  order  to  ease  the  monetary  policy  as  follows:  
-­‐ Reducing  the  interest  rate  policy  from  a  maximum  of  10.25%  in  September  2008  to  8%  at  the  
end  of  2009,  ending  to  a  6.25%  at  the  middle  of  2010;  while  maintaining  the  current  levels  of  
minimum  reserve  ratio  to  15%  for  RON  and  25%  for  foreign  currency;  
-­‐ Stronger   liquidity   and   solvency   management   through   (National   Bank   of   Romania,   2008):  
better   inter-­‐banking   monitoring,   financial   instruments   in   order   to   cover   liquidity  
disequilibrium  in  the  banking  system  (Lombard    facility,  foreign  currency  swap),  standardized  
reports   regarding   the  banks’  granted   loans  and  deposits,  banks’  management  meetings   for  
the  analysis  of  the  identified  risks,  strategies,  plans,  capital  requirements.  
   In   order   to   increase   the   stability   of   the   financial   system,   NBR   proceeded   with   changes   in  
provisioning  system  in  the  sense  of  a  better  coverage  of  the  exposure  and  with  increasing  the  limit  
for  granting  the  deposits  from  20,000  EUR  to  50,000  EUR.  
   In   March   2009,   NBR   underlined   the   need   for   external   financing   in   order   to   support   the  
country’s   economic   development.   Following   this   decision,   two   credit   facilities   were   granted:   a   20  
billion  EUR  loan  granted  by  IMF  and  a  1  billion  EUR  loan  granted  by  World  Bank.  The  IMF  loan  was  
granted  with  the  specific  targets  of  offsetting  the  crisis  effects  of  the  worrying  drop  in  private  capital  
inflows,   strengthening   the   financial   sector,   addressing   external   and   fiscal   imbalances.   The   World  
Bank   financial   support   focused   on   three   fundamental   areas   (Zaman,   2009)   with   determinant  
influence  on   long-­‐term  stabilization  and  economic  restructuring:  *public  sector  reforms  to   improve  
public  financial  management  through  better  transparency,  predictability,   increased  quality   in  public  
services   (health,   education);   *strengthening   social   protection   (social   assistance   and   pensions)   to  
absorb   the   crisis   impact   on   the  more   vulnerable   social   segments;   *financial   sector   reforms   –   The  
World  Bank  focusing  on  medium-­‐term  reforms  that  support  the  IMF  program.  
   Being   given   the   above   measures,   the   positive   effects   are   expected   to   appear   from   2011,  
being   expected,   accordingly   to   IMF   predictions,   an   economic   increase   of   1.5%.   As   seen   up   to   the  
present  time,  the  main  problem  standing  in  the  implementation  of  these  reforms  stands  in  the  public  
money  mismanagement,  characterized  by  lack  of  transparency,  predictability  and  still  high  levels.  
	   8.  Conclusion  
   The   present   crisis   spread   by   contagion   to   the   whole   world   is   the   result   of   a   risky   and  
irrational   behavior   assessed   by   the   participants   in   the   economic   flow:   population,   companies,  
financial  institutions,  public  entities,  with  consequences  on  the  global  economy.    
   Being   given   the   crisis   echo   it   is   important   to   outline   the   lessons   coming   from   the  world’s  
economies  vulnerabilities  in  order  to  create  a  more  developed  and  stable  global  economic  structure:  
revision   of   the   motto   “some   financial   institutions   are   too   big   to   fail”,   prudential   supervision   of  
financial   markets   in   accordance   with   present   conditions,   the   asset   price   inflation’   control   under  
certain  governmental   and  monetary  authorities,   the   set-­‐up  of   regulatory  environment   for   financial  
innovations,  rational,  systematic  and  coordinated  measures.  
   In   the  specific   case  of  Romania,   the   lessons   refer   to   the  collaboration  between   the  Central  
Bank   and   Government   in   order   to   establish   macroeconomic   stability   through   channeling   funds  
toward   the   productive   segments   (small,   medium   firms,   corporate),   improving   infrastructure  
(decreasing   unemployment,   increasing   income   and   consumption)   and   lowering   non-­‐productive  
expenses.    
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Table  2.  Export  Volume  and  Production  Decreasing  in  2009  
  
Graph  2.  Net  Capital  Inflows  Decrease  in  2008  
  
Table  3.  Remittances  flow  to  developing  countries  
  
Graph  3:  Construction  licenses  issued  for  buildings  
  
  
Table  4:  Comparison  between  the  average  income  and  the  price  of  a  2  rooms  apartment  in  a  medium  
area  
Crt no Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1 
Monthly net salary 
(eur) 188 195 229 273 324 430 460 
2 
Apartment price 
(EUR) 12,500 20,000 35,000 48,000 60,000 85,000 90,000 
3 2/1 66 103 153 176 185 198 196 
  
  
